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Abstract
This paper seeks to give solutions to possible demands for lawful in-
terception of communications. Certain modications to the ASPeCT Au-
thentication and Initialisation of Payment protocol are proposed that give
it a key recovery capability. The modied protocol fulls potential govern-
ment requirements for lawful interception while protecting the user from
unauthorized disclosure of his/her communications.
Keywords: UMTS, key recovery.
1 Introduction
The growth of telecommunications has created a clear demand for lawful inter-
ception, mainly for the investigation of serious crime and for national security
reasons. Before the employment of encryption for the protection of communica-
tions, access to transmitted data was just a matter of wire-tapping or listening
to the air interface. The introduction of condentiality services for protect-
ing communications and archived data has created the need for key recovery
(escrow) services [1].
This paper proposes certain modications to the ASPeCT (Advanced Se-
curity for Personal Communications Technology) Authentication and Initiali-
sation of Payment (AIP) protocol that give it a key recovery capability. The
modied mechanism gives Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) access to tran-
sient keys and therefore oers the capability of accessing, when authorized,
suspected communications while protecting the user from unauthorized disclo-
sure of his/her data. LEAs will only be able to access the communications they
are authorized to.

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2 The ASPeCT AIP Protocol
Among the authentication schemes proposed for third generation mobile sys-
tems is the one designed and implemented by the collaborative research project
ASPeCT. The ASPeCT AIP protocol was developed for authentication between
a user U and a value added service provider (VASP) V in Universal Mobile
Telecommunications System (UMTS) environments. Two basic models have
been designed for this purpose (B and C variants).
2.1 Authentication without an on-line TTP (B-Variant)
A detailed description of this model is given in [3] and the messages exchanged
are specied in Fig.1.
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Figure 1: ASPeCT AIP Protocol (B-Variant)
In this model U generates a random number u, computes g
u
and sends
it to V together with the identity idCAV of the authority whose certicates
U can verify. On receipt of the rst message V generates a random number
r and computes a session key K = h1((g
u
)
v
k r) where v is V 's private key
agreement key and h1 a hash function. V then sends U the random number
r, the hash value h2(K k r k idV ) and its certicate certV together with a
time-stamp TV and charging-relevant data ch data. On receipt of the second
message, U computes the key K = h1((g
v
)
u
k r) and compares the hashed
value h2(K k r k idV ) with the one received. If the check succeeds U generates
the signature shown in Fig.1, including random number IV and 
T
= F
T
IV
(
0
),
where 
0
is random, as required by the payment protocol, and sends the last
message encrypted with K.
2.2 Authentication with an on-line TTP (C-variant)
The second authentication model involves an on-line TTP. The protocol de-
scribed is an adaptation of the one published in [4] and has the same properties
as the ones in [6] and [2]. The messages exchanged are specied in Fig.2 and a
full description and analysis of the protocol is given in [3].
In this variant of the protocol U sends V the value g
u
together with the
identity idTTP of his TTP and his own identity idU encrypted under session
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Figure 2: ASPeCT AIP Protocol (C-Variant)
key L = g
uw
, where g
w
is TTP's public key agreement key. As soon as V receives
the rst message it connects to U 's TTP and forwards the message sent by U
together with its certicate CertV . On receipt of the second authentication
message the TTP checks whether U 's and optionally V 's certicates have been
revoked. If both certicates are valid, the TTP generates the certicate chains
and sends them back to V together with a time-stamp TT and a signature on
the certicate identiers cidU and cidV , the time-stamp TT and the random
number g
u
. V veries CertChain(V;U) and the signature using the TTP's
public key which retrieves from CertChain(V; T ). It computes a hash value on
the session keyK concatenated with the random number r and V 's identity idV .
V also encrypts the signature with key K. V then forwards to U the encrypted
signature together with the hash value h2(K k r k idV ), the cross-certicate
for V 's public key CertChain(U; V ), the random number r, the time-stamp TT
and charge data ch data. On receipt of the fourth authentication message U
decrypts the signature, checks its validity and that of the cross-certicate, and
if the checks are successful U responds with the fth authentication message.
3 Requirements and Goals for Key Recovery in the
ASPeCT Protocol
Among the properties of the ASPeCT AIP protocol is the establishment of a
secret session key K = h1(g
uv
; r). The enhanced protocol should give the TTP,
which acts as a Key Recovery Agent (KRA), the ability to recover the requested
session key K when provided with the appropriate key recovery material. One
of the main requirements of the key recovery mechanism employed is to keep
the computational overhead at the user end at the same level. This is desirable
because all the user computations are typically performed by a smart card. An
eective solution would therefore be to make the key recovery mechanism part
of the key establishment process without introducing any vulnerabilities. In
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this paper two dierent solutions to the key recovery problem are proposed.
Although both solutions apply to both basic models of the ASPeCT protocol,
for brevity we apply one solution to each model.
3.1 B-variant protocol with key recovery capability
The B-variant can be given a key recovery capability by slightly modifying the
way that U 's key component u is generated. Note that, in the existing variants
of the protocol, the value u is chosen at random by U prior to the start of the
protocol.
The user's key component generation becomes a two-phase procedure. First,
there is a key recovery registration phase where the user registers with his TTP,
in an escrow-like mechanism, an initial secret key value k
u
. Second, each time
the user wants to generate a key component, the key generation phase, he/she
generates a random (or serial) number s and combines s and k
u
to get the key
component u. That is, u = f(k
u
; s) where f should be a one way function (cf.
the requirements given in clause 6 of ISO/IEC 11770-3 [5]). In order for the
TTP to be able to compute the value u, U has to send the TTP his own identity
idU and the value s encrypted under L = (g
w
)
u
, where g
w
is the TTP's public
key agreement key. The modied scheme therefore, requires the TTP to have
a key agreement key, as in the C-variant. Thus, the modied protocol is as
specied in Fig.3.
USER U VASP V
{ }Lu idCAVg s||idU||||
Figure 3: Modied B-variant Protocol
In U 's domain, the keys can be recovered as follows.
 The entity requesting key recovery gives U 's TTP, which acts as a KRA,
the following intercepted values:
1. The one-time random value g
u
, V 's certicate certV , the random
number r and the encrypted value fidU k sg
L
. The TTP, using the
value g
u
and its private key agreement key w can compute the session
key L and therefore decrypt the value fidU k sg
L
. This will enable
the TTP to compute the value u and, having already the values r
and g
v
, to recover the key K and send it to the requesting entity.
2. The last authentication message sent by U to V together with the
charging data ch data and the time-stamp TT . These values will
help the TTP verify U 's signature so that it can check that the
request is within the scope of the warrant.
More generally, a second one-way function f

could be employed to increase
exibility. The user would keep a long term secret k

u
(also known to the
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user's TTP). From this value the user would compute a `xed term' secret k
u
,
by combining k

u
and a date stamp using f

. In such a case the TTP could
disclose the value k
u
for a particular time period to the intercepting authority,
and would thereby only reveal the user's key values u for a xed time interval.
In V 's domain, however, the procedure is slightly dierent, and the key re-
covery process is less exible. This is because it would typically not be desirable
to send the user's secret key component to V 's TTP (especially when U 's and
V 's TTPs are in dierent domains or simply when V 's TTP is not trusted by
the user). Therefore, V has to register with its TTP the private key agreement
key v. This can be done at the time a certicate on the public key agreement
key g
v
is requested and issued. Thus, in V 's domain the key recovery proce-
dure is almost the same as in U 's domain. The only dierence is the way that
V 's TTP recovers the session key K. However, the exibility provided in the
user's domain is no longer available, since if V 's private key agreement key v
is revealed, then all previous and subsequent communications to and from the
VASP can be decrypted. In most scenarios this will be inappropriate, so the
TTP must pass to the entity requesting recovery only the session key K.
Finally note that the value s could also be sent in clear (and not encrypted
under L). In such a case the function f must have the property that, given
the input value s, an adversary cannot get any information on the output u
(without knowledge of k
u
).
3.2 C-variant protocol with key recovery capability
In this section another solution to the key recovery problem is proposed which,
as mentioned earlier, can also apply to the B-variant. Essentially, this variant
gives a key recovery capability simply by passing the TTP the key component
u encrypted under the secret key L. This gives the TTP the ability to recover
the key K. Thus, the two rst messages of the enhanced protocol (this is the
only modication required) are as shown in Fig.4:
USER U VASP V TTP
{ }Lu idUidTTPg u||||||
          { } certVidUg Lu |||||| u
Figure 4: Modied Protocol Variant C6
In this solution, as mentioned earlier, U simply passes to its TTP the gen-
erated key component u encrypted under L. Thus, when intercepting the com-
munication between the user and the VASP, all the information needed by the
user's TTP to compute the session key K is available. The key recovery proce-
dure is the same as in the previous solution both in U 's and V 's domain except
for the session key K computation and the fact that the TTP's signature is
sucient to check that the request is within the scope of the warrant.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper two mechanisms that give the ASPeCT AIP protocol a key recov-
ery capability were proposed. The main requirements were to keep the changes
required to a minimum and at the same time minimise the computational over-
head at the user's end. The proposed mechanisms solve demands for warranted
access to communications while protecting the user from further unauthorized
disclosure of his/her data.
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